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 Within- and between-group agreement in 
supervisor’s evaluative behaviours: 
 do evaluative ‘styles’ exist? 
 
Abstract 
Several management accounting studies have investigated the behavioural impact of 
evaluative style, a concept that generally refers to the manner in which supervisors use 
accounting information to evaluate the performance of subordinates. Although most 
studies study this behavioural impact at the individual level of the subordinate, the term 
“evaluative style” suggests that evaluative behaviours and attitudes of single supervisors 
will show (some) consistency across subordinates. This paper investigates whether 
“evaluative styles” exist by examining within-group and between-group agreement in 
evaluative behaviours by subordinates reporting to the same supervisor. The findings from 
two empirical studies indicate that evaluative behaviours in both organisations show both 
within-group and between-group variability. These findings suggest that evaluative 
behaviours of supervisors are more appropriately analysed at the level of individual 
subordinates than at the level of groups, although a dyadic level of analysis should be 
considered as well. An implication of these findings is that the concept of “evaluative 
style” is misleading. A suggestion is made to use the term “evaluatorship” instead as an 
umbrella concept to refer to evaluative behaviours and attitudes of supervisors at 
different levels of analysis in future research. 
 
KEYWORDS: performance evaluation, evaluative style, within-group agreement, WABA, 
levels of analysis 
 
1 Introduction 
In the management accounting and control literature research level-of-analysis issues have 
hardly been addressed. This is surprising given the attention that is given to these issues in 
fields like leadership and organizational behaviour over the past two decades. In this 
paper, I argue that the following statement of Schriesheim at al. (2001, p. 516) made in 
the context of leadership also applies to management accounting and control research in 
general: 
 
“We believe that it is absolutely critical that scholars specify the level of analysis at which 
their hypotheses, frameworks, models, and/or theories hold so that they may be 
adequately tested. We also believe that it is absolutely necessary that tests of any 
hypothesis, framework, model, and/or theory be conducted at the proper level(s) of 
analysis and that tests explicitly rule out inappropriate or competing (rival) levels of 
analysis.” 
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One particular area of the management accounting and control literature to which this 
statement applies is research on the role of supervisors in performance evaluation and its 
effect on subordinate managers.  An important part of the accounting literature around 
this topic has investigated the behavioural impact of evaluative style, or performance 
evaluation style, a construct generally referring to (perceived) differences in the manner 
in which managers use accounting information, particularly budgetary information, to 
evaluate the performance of their subordinate managers. Although these studies have 
been classified under the general heading of RAPM (reliance on accounting performance 
measures), suggesting the existence of a coherent research stream, recently, it has been 
demonstrated that the RAPM-literature contains a wide variety of concepts and measures 
of evaluative style without appropriate consideration of validity and reliability issues 
(Otley & Fakiolas, 2000; Vagneur & Peiperl, 2000; Hartmann, 2000; Noeverman, Koene, & 
Williams, 2005). This is only one of the numerous problems of the RAPM-literature that 
have been spelled out in reviews of the work conducted in this area (see Briers & Hirst, 
1990; Hartmann, 2000; Hartmann & Moers, 1999; 2003; Dunk, 2003; Otley & Pollanen, 
2000; Otley & Fakiolas, 2000; Vagneur & Peiperl, 2000), and several recommendations 
have been made to restore the flaws in existing RAPM-studies. However, in my opinion, 
even the latest criticisms and recommendations have not sufficiently dealt with an issue 
that is  fundamental for understanding the role of supervisors in performance evaluation 
and its behavioural and motivational effects on subordinates. This is the issue whether 
“evaluative styles” do exist, and if so, at what level of analysis. 
Most RAPM-studies have used subordinates‟ perceptions of their supervisor‟s evaluative 
style as a measure of evaluative style, and many studies have used data collected from 
subordinates within one single organisation, often with multiple subordinates from one 
supervisor. By analysing such data at the individual subordinate level-of-analysis, these 
analyses assume that “evaluative style” and its effects on attitudinal outcomes such as job 
related tension and job satisfaction are independent of group effects, thus that the 
relationships found hold both within-groups and between-groups. This implicit level-of-
analysis assumption has never been tested, while progress in research methods in 
leadership and organisational research over the past few decades allow testing this 
assumption. 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to address level of analysis issues around the concept of 
“evaluative style” by exploring and testing within- and between-group agreement in 
evaluative behaviours of supervisors within the context of a single organisation. 
Specifically, this study will answer the following three research questions: Do differences 
  4 
in perceived evaluative behaviours across subordinates reporting to different supervisors 
occur at the level of individual subordinates or do they reflect differences at a higher 
level, i.e. between-group differences? Do subordinates who are evaluated by the same 
supervisor report differences in perceived evaluative behaviours (i.e., within-group 
differences), or do they report similar evaluative behaviours (i.e., within-group-
agreement)? And if there are within-group differences in perceived evaluative behaviours, 
do these reflect differences that are intended by the supervisor? To answer these 
questions, I conducted two exploratory studies, each using a different research 
methodology. The first study was a small qualitative study, based on interview data 
obtained from two supervisors and three subordinates reporting to each of these 
supervisors. The second study was a quantitative analysis of within- and between-group 
differences in the perceived quality of performance feedback from their supervisor as 
reported by 51 subordinates reporting to eight different supervisors. The results from both 
studies indicated that both within- and between-group differences existed. These findings 
indicate that the group level-of-analysis seems inappropriate, and support an individual 
subordinate level of analysis. However, there is also evidence that dyads rather than 
groups or individual subordinates could be the appropriate level of analysis. Implications 
of these findings for future research in management accounting are discussed. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section provides an 
overview of the literature on levels of analysis terminology, on the role of leaders in 
performance evaluation, and on evaluative style. This overview results in four hypotheses. 
The third and fourth section describe the two small empirical studies. Section 3 reports 
the results from the qualitative study; section 4 reports the results from the quantitative 
analysis of data on feedback quality. Both sections are closed with a brief discussion of the 
most important findings from each study. Finally, in section 5, implications for future 
research are discussed and an overall conclusion is drawn.  
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Levels of theory, measurement and data analysis 
Although explicit consideration of levels-of-analysis issues in management accounting 
literature is rare, these issues have received increasing attention in leadership research 
since the seminal work of Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino (1984).  
Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino (1984) developed a conceptual framework and empirical 
approach to address levels of analysis. They distinguish between entities, level of analysis 
and unit of analysis. Entities are the specific objects of interest to a researcher. Levels of 
analysis refer to categories or classifications of entities arranged in a hierarchical order 
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such that higher levels include lower levels of analysis. And the unit of analysis refers to 
the characterisation of a single entity in terms of parts or wholes at a specific level of 
analysis. I will clarify these terms using insights from leadership research. 
In a recent review of levels of analysis in leadership research, Yammarino et al.(2005) 
distinguish four different levels of analysis that are relevant for studying leadership. The 
first level is the level of individuals or persons, independent of one another. The second 
level is the level of dyads, defined as two interdependent (on a one-to-one basis) 
individuals. The third level is the level of groups or teams, usually understood as a 
collection of individuals who are interdependent and interact on a face-to-face or virtual 
basis with one another. The fourth level is the level of collectives, which are clusters of 
individuals, larger than groups, who are interdependent based on some form of clustering, 
whether hierarchical (such as managerial level, functional areas, departments, or business 
units) or based on common/shared expectations. 
Within each of these levels of analysis it is possible to focus on wholes or on parts as the 
unit of analysis. For example, depending on the theory used to explain leadership, at the 
individual level of the supervisor the supervisor (the entity) can be viewed as a whole 
person or the focus may be on parts within the supervisor. In earlier research on 
leadership, researchers –often implicitly- assumed that each supervisor had a certain 
“leadership style”, treating each subordinate reporting to him in exactly the same way. In 
this view, called the Average Leadership Style (ALS) approach, the supervisor was viewed 
as a whole person with regard to his style of leadership (Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 
1984). In contrast, in the Vertical Dyad Linkage (VDL) approach (Graen & Schiemann, 
1978), supervisors are expected to vary their leadership behaviours across subordinates, 
depending on the relative position of one subordinate to other subordinates. Thus, the 
leadership behaviours towards one subordinate are dependent on a comparison between 
subordinates that occurs within a supervisor. In this view, a supervisor is viewed in terms 
of parts rather than wholes (Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino., 1984). The choice which of 
the two approaches is most appropriate in a specific study should be informed by theory, 
but also depends on the leadership dimensions of interest. This is commonly referred to as 
the level of theory, which refers to making explicit what the target level of analysis is 
(e.g., individual, dyad, group, organization) that the researcher aims to depict and explain 
(Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Luft & Shields, 2003). Besides the level of theory, two 
other terms are also important, which are the level of measurement and the level of data 
analysis. The level of measurement refers to the level at which data is collected or 
obtained. For example, we may ask the supervisor to fill out one questionnaire with one 
set of questions about his leadership behaviours. This self-reported data is collected at the 
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level of the supervisor as a whole. We may also ask a supervisor to fill out several 
questionnaires about his leadership behaviours, each for one specific subordinate. This 
self-reported data is then collected at the level of supervisor parts. Finally, the level of 
statistical analysis refers to the level at which the data (measured at a certain level) is 
actually analysed. For example, data on leadership behaviours of supervisors obtained 
from subordinates may be aggregated and the group mean may be used as an indication of 
“Average Leadership Style” (ALS). Although the data is collected at the level of individual 
subordinates, by aggregating the data it is analysed at the group level.   
 
2.2 Guidelines to address levels-of-analysis issues 
In their review of the management accounting literature, Luft & Shields (2003) asked 
researchers to pay attention to levels of analysis issues in management accounting 
research. They presented a number of guidelines to address levels issues (pp. 199-200): 
 
1. Indicate whether the variable of interest varies across individuals, organizational 
subunits, organizations, or beyond-organization entities like markets and societies. 
2. Align the level of theory (what is being explained), level of variable measurement 
(source of evidence), and level of data analysis (unit of data). 
3. If theoretical variables at multiple levels affect the observable measures, then separate 
the effects from multiple levels. 
4. If cross-level effects are proposed, then use an interaction causal-model form, with at 
least one interacting (independent or moderator) variable at the level of the dependent 
variable. 
5. If the variation of interest in a variable is variation in its value relative to a subset of 
other values in the sample, then use an individual-within-group-level model. 
 
Although these guidelines may indeed be helpful in addressing levels issues, unfortunately, 
they do not provide much guidance on how to determine the appropriate level of theory or 
the expected level of variance in the construct of interest (guideline 1). This however is a 
very important step that needs to be taken before the other guidelines can be taken into 
account. This step requires a consideration of the theoretical and methodological issues 
involved in determining the appropriate level(s) of analysis of a construct. Klein, 
Dansereau, & Hall (1994, p.196) presented a theory-based framework based on the 
assertion that “precise articulation of the level of one's constructs is an important priority 
for all organizational scholars whether they propose single- or mixed-level theories”. Thus, 
the main focus of their framework is on the level of theory. Assuming the level of 
measurement is individual subordinates as members of groups within a single organisation, 
the researcher has three basic alternatives as to the appropriate level of analysis. The 
researcher may predict that the responses from individuals are homogeneous, independent 
  7 
or heterogeneous responses with regard to the construct of interest. When homogeneity is 
specified, the researcher predicts that the construct of interest does not vary between 
individual group members. Thus, within-group agreement or low variance in responses 
within the group is expected. Any within-group variance is considered to be 
(measurement) error, so the group is treated as a whole (cf. Dansereau, Alutto, & 
Yammarino, 1984). In contrast, the researcher may also specify that individual responses 
are independent of group membership. In this view group membership is irrelevant. Thus, 
the appropriate level of analysis is the individual subordinate, while the group level of 
analysis is inappropriate. Variability in the constructs of interest is pure between-
individual variance, and within- and between-group variances are irrelevant because 
groups in itself are irrelevant. The third alternative is to specify heterogeneity or view the 
individual responses as parts within the group. In this view, the researcher predicts that 
subordinates are compared or ranked within the group, focusing on the relative position of 
individual responses as compared to the group mean. In this view, individual responses are 
expected to vary within groups, but the groups are still relevant and even necessary to 
interpret individual responses on the construct of interest. So, the focus is on within-group 
variance (deviances from the average group score). The Vertical Dyad Linkage (VDL) 
approach to which I referred earlier provides a good example of a leadership construct in 
which heterogeneity within groups will be specified. 
 
2.3 Role of leaders in performance evaluation 
In accounting research, performance measurement and performance evaluation are 
popular topics. Most accounting research focuses on the design of effective performance 
measurement systems, or on the incentive effects of performance measures. Only a small 
part of the accounting literature has investigated the role of supervisors in performance 
evaluation. This is surprising, given the fact that in many organisations the formal 
performance evaluation system allows supervisors (some) discretion in how they apply 
elements of the system when evaluating the performance of subordinates. Such discretion 
introduces subjectivity in the performance evaluation of subordinates. This subjectivity 
may take different forms. For example, in the context of bonus determination, Gibbs, 
Merchant, & Vargus (2004) stated that subjectivity may arise from (1) all or part of a 
bonus is based on subjective judgments about performance; (2) the weights on some or all 
quantitative measures are determined subjectively, or (3) a subjective performance 
threshold or “override” is used, in which case a subjective determination as to whether or 
not to pay a bonus is made based on measured performance and other factors. These 
three forms of subjectivity can also be distinguished in the context of performance 
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evaluation in general. Depending on how much discretion the supervisor has given the 
formal design of the performance evaluation system and the wider organisational context 
in which performance evaluation takes place, subjectivity in a particular organisation may 
be limited to just one of these three possible forms, or any combination of these forms. 
Whatever the exact form in which subjectivity occurs within an organisation, if supervisors 
have discretion in determining performance ratings and bonuses, it is interesting to 
investigate whether supervisors within a particular organisation show variability in the 
level of subjectivity used to evaluate the performance of subordinates (for example, one 
supervisor uses more subjective performance criteria than another supervisor). 
Additionally, even more interesting is the question whether there is variability 
(heterogeneity) or lack thereof (homogeneity) in the level of subjectivity used by a single 
supervisor in the performance evaluation of each of his subordinates. 
 
2.4 RAPM and ‘evaluative style’ 
Even the small part of the management accounting literature that focuses on the role of 
supervisors in performance evaluation lacks explicit consideration of such issues, albeit 
necessary to interpret and understand the findings of these studies and their practical 
relevance. This is particularly true for, although certainly not limited to, the part of 
management accounting research that has become known as the RAPM-literature. This 
literature contains studies that focused on “evaluative style”, referring to the manner in 
which a supervisor uses accounting information or accounting performance measures for 
the purpose of evaluating his subordinates. Several reviews of the RAPM-literature have 
appeared over the last decade, indicating the problematic state of this literature. One of 
these problems is the lack of a uniform definition and conceptualisation of evaluative style 
(Otley & Fakiolas, 2000; Otley & Pollanen, 2000; Merchant & Otley, 2007), and the lack of 
reliability, validity and comparability of the measures that were used to capture different 
evaluative styles (Vagneur & Peiperl, 2000; Noeverman, Koene, & Williams, 2005). Since 
the focus of my study is on levels-of-analysis issues, I will not discuss these problems in 
RAPM in detail here, nor do I want to discuss the different concepts and measures of 
evaluative style. I merely refer to the RAPM literature here for two reasons. First, despite 
its problematic state, the RAPM literature is a good example of management accounting 
research in which consideration of levels-of-analysis issues is essential, given the focus on 
“evaluative style” as the focal construct of interest. Second, this literature has evolved 
from two early studies that focused explicitly on the role of supervisors in performance 
evaluation, that of Hopwood (1972; 1973; 1974) and Otley (1978). In these two studies, 
levels-of-analysis issues were raised which have been completely ignored in later research, 
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but are still relevant for contemporary research on supervisors‟ discretionary choices and 
behaviours in managerial performance evaluation. 
 
Hopwood (1972; 1973; 1974) 
Hopwood (1972; 1973; 1974) studied the plurality of ways in which managers within one 
large Chicago-based company used accounting information for managerial performance 
evaluation. Hopwood distinguished three “styles of evaluation” within this organisation: a 
Budget-Constrained style, a Profit-Conscious style, and a Non-accounting style. His sample 
consisted of 167 cost centre heads that were evaluated by 26 departmental supervisors. 
These departmental supervisors, in turn, reported to a number of area managers. Cost 
centre heads were asked to indicate the style of evaluation of their departmental 
supervisor, while the departmental supervisors were asked to indicate the style of 
evaluation of their area manager. In addition, the departmental supervisors were also 
asked to report on their own intended style of evaluation. 
To test for contagion effects, an effect referring to the tendency of managers to evaluate 
their subordinates in the same way as they themselves perceive to be evaluated, Hopwood 
aggregated the individual responses of cost centre heads to obtain a measure of the 
dominant style of evaluation of the departmental supervisor. The departmental 
supervisor‟s dominant style was categorised as one of the three styles when more than 40% 
of the cost centre heads reported that they perceived that particular style. 
Interestingly, Hopwood (1974) reported that in 19 of the 27 departments, there was 
considerable agreement between subordinates in their perception of the departmental 
supervisor‟s style. In 8 departments, however, there was considerable disagreement. 
Hopwood‟s analysis of these 8 departments provided some evidence that the divisional 
supervisors emphasised the Budget Constrained style especially with cost centres which 
were likely to have the greatest impact on the departmental results, i.e. those cost 
centres that most likely affected his own performance the most. These were the cost 
centre heads that were less successful in meeting the budget and were heads of relatively 
large cost centres within the department. Thus, Hopwood (1974, p. 491) concluded, 
“managers do not necessarily use one personal style of management irrespective of their 
circumstances and subordinates”. 
Finally, Hopwood (1974) also found that there was considerable disagreement between the 
perceived dominant style of the divisional managers and their intended style of 
evaluation. Thus, self-reported styles of evaluation are not necessarily equivalent with the 
subordinates‟ perceived styles of evaluation. However, it should be noted that each of the 
divisional managers was asked to report one single intended style of evaluation, while 
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Hopwood‟s (1974) analysis of the data provided evidence that some departmental 
supervisors tried to adapt their styles to the circumstances and subordinates, as stated 
above.  
 
Otley (1978) 
Otley (1978) replicated Hopwood‟s (1972) study in a single organisation in which the use of 
budgetary accounting information was well suited, in contrast to Hopwood‟s setting in 
which accounting information had severe shortcomings. Otley‟s sample consisted of 41 
unit managers from three geographically different groups headed by three different group 
managers. Otley explicitly stated that the unit of analysis of his study was the individual 
unit manager who reported to his group manager. Accordingly, Otley (1978, p. 127) 
defines the style of evaluation as “the way in which a unit manager perceives the budget 
to be used in evaluating his performance, in relation to other relevant information.“ Based 
on the responses of the unit managers, Otley distinguished five evaluative styles. But even 
though his main focus was on the unit managers‟ perceptions, Otley also addressed the 
question whether group managers choose their evaluative style, and whether they 
differentiate between units and unit managers. His results (pp.140-141) indicated that 
 
„Despite considerable differences in perceived evaluative style perceived by managers in 
each group, there were significant differences between groups… These perceived 
differences correspond very closely to the nuances of style that senior group managers 
intend to transmit to their subordinates.‟  
 
“It is evident that unit managers were perceiving differences in perceived evaluative style 
that were intended to be transmitted by group managers. However, it is also clear that 
there was a significant degree of bias in either group managers‟ projection of their 
intended style or of unit managers‟ perceptions of it.” 
 
Otley (1978) provided some evidence that the intended style of evaluation was affected by 
three factors: the personal philosophy and personality of the group manager, 
environmental and economic circumstances at the group level, and the relative size of 
operating units within the group. While the first two factors help explain differences 
between intended styles of evaluation at the level of the group managers, the third factor 
suggests that there is not one intended style of evaluation, but that group managers may 
choose to differentiate their intended style of evaluation. Both Hopwood (1974) and Otley 
(1978) found that such variation in intended style may be attributable in part to the 
relative impact of a single unit to the overall group performance on which the group 
managers are evaluated themselves. 
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2.5 Development of hypotheses 
Based on the findings from Hopwood (1974) and Otley (1978) I draw the following 
conclusions. First, a distinction should be made between intended evaluative behaviours 
and perceived evaluative behaviours. Intended evaluative behaviours reflect the general 
manner in which supervisors say they are evaluating their subordinates, while perceived 
evaluative behaviours reflect the manner in which individual subordinates say their 
manager is evaluating their performance. The perceived evaluative behaviours may or may 
not reflect the intended evaluative behaviours. Second, between-group differences in 
perceived evaluative behaviours are likely to exist, a conclusion that is in line with 
Hopwood's (1974) findings. Furthermore, such between-group differences seem to 
correspond with differences between supervisors in intended style of evaluation. 
Apparently, different supervisors do evaluate their subordinates in different ways, which 
partly explains between-group differences in perceived evaluative behaviours. Third, 
although between-group differences exist, there are considerable within-group differences 
in perceived evaluative behaviours as well. These differences may occur because a 
supervisor may intentionally evaluate different subordinates in different ways and/or 
because individuals may perceive the intended style differently (i.e., measurement error). 
Fourth, Hopwood‟s finding that in 8 of the 27 departments there was (far) less agreement 
on perceived style of evaluation among the cost centre heads indicates that evaluators 
may differ in the extent to which they differentiate their intended styles of evaluation. 
These conclusions, primarily based on empirical evidence, are also supported by 
theoretical arguments from a study by Schriesheim, Cogliser, & Neider (1995) on the level 
of analysis of the Ohio State leadership model. This leadership model distinguishes two 
dimensions of leadership, consideration and initiating structure, which have been used in 
several accounting studies (DeCoster & Fertakis, 1968; Hopwood, 1973; 1974; Pratt & 
Jiambalvo, 1981; 1982; Jiambalvo & Pratt, 1982; Brownell, 1983; Otley & Pierce, 1995). In 
their study, Schriesheim, Cogliser, & Neider (1995, pp. 117-118) argue that leadership 
could be treated as both a between-groups and a within-group phenomenon. They argue 
that the between-groups view is supported by notions of consistencies in behaviour across 
persons and situations in many areas of psychology, especially in the fields of personality 
and clinical psychology. Furthermore, they argue, that  
 
“Equity theory (e.g., Adams, 1963) would predict at least some general behavioural 
consistencies from supervisors, arising from such causes as the need to maintain equity 
among work unit members and limitations in the resources (e.g., time, energy, etc.) 
available to supervisors for them to tailor different behaviours toward different 
subordinates.” (p. 117) 
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But there is also much evidence and theory that supports viewing leadership as a dyadic or 
within-groups phenomenon: 
 
“For example, expectancy theory (e.g., Vroom, 1964) would predict that leaders will 
behave differently toward subordinates in their work unit, depending upon how 
instrumental each is to furthering his or her desired goals or outcomes.” (p. 118) 
 
These same theoretical arguments can also be applied to evaluative behaviours of 
supervisors. Thus, there is both empirical and theoretical support for the view that 
evaluative behaviours of supervisors are likely to contain some consistencies across 
subordinates (i.e., constitute “styles”), while at the same time subordinates from the 
same group or work unit may be treated differently. Thus, I expect both between-groups 
and within-group differences in evaluative behaviours. 
This leads to the following hypotheses that will be explored empirically in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1. There are significant between-group differences in perceived evaluative 
behaviours of the supervisor (where groups are subordinates reporting to 
the same supervisor). 
 
Hypothesis 2. There are significant differences in perceived evaluative behaviours of 
the supervisor within groups of subordinates reporting to the same 
supervisor. 
 It should be noted however that these theoretical arguments are based on the implicit 
assumption that the supervisor actually has some discretion in determining how to 
evaluate the performance of subordinates. But given the existence of this discretion, it is 
likely that supervisors will use this discretion in different ways. Each supervisor, for 
example, has to make a decision on the resources he or she is willing to spend on 
performance evaluation, which will possibly also affect the opportunity to behave 
differently towards subordinates. Thus, in choosing how to evaluate the performance of 
individual subordinates, supervisors may implicitly or explicitly trade-off costs and 
benefits of alternative evaluative behaviours. Therefore, it is likely that there will occur 
differences in the level of within-group variability between supervisors, and, 
consequently, between groups of subordinates. 
 
This leads to the following hypotheses that will be explored empirically in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 3. There will be significant differences in the level of within-group 
agreement between groups of subordinates. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Within- and between-group differences in perceived evaluative 
behaviours are related to differences in intended evaluative behaviours. 
 
3. Empirical study 1 
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3.1 Research setting and methodology 
The first empirical study took place within the business unit Letters of TPG Post, the 
Dutch Royal mail company. This research setting is the same setting as the study 
conducted by Wiersma (2008). The organisation was chosen because it was a large branch-
type organisation, which made it relatively easy to interview subordinate managers at the 
same level in the organisation and with similar job responsibilities, i.e. branch managers, 
who report to and are evaluated by the same supervisor, i.e. an area manager. I was able 
to get access to the organisation through the Head of Management Development. 
Data were collected through different sources. I conducted two interviews with the Head 
of Management Development and collected a number of documents that described the 
rules and procedures of the performance evaluation system. The Head of Management 
Development gave us the names of two area managers that I could talk to. Both 
immediately agreed to participate in the study. 
 
In one area (area X) I interviewed the area manager and three branch managers (X1, X2 
and X3). In the other area (area Y) I interviewed the area manager (Y), two branch 
managers (Y1 and Y2) and the manager of Customer Service (Y3). Although the area 
manager evaluates the latter's performance too, it is important to realize that manager Y3 
was in a staff function, not in a line management function. His position was not directly 
comparable to the position of the branch managers. The Customer Service manager 
replaced the Area Manager in case of absence. Furthermore, the Customer Service 
department provided monthly and quarterly management information on the performance 
of the area as a whole, and all branches within the area. The Service Manager was 
interviewed to get an independent view on how the area manager evaluated the branch 
managers. The branch managers were the lowest management level (of four levels) in the 
organisation, supervising employees in non-managerial positions. 
All interviews were held in the summer of 1997, a period that falls within the same time 
period as that on which Wiersma‟s (2008) data analysis was based. Although the evaluative 
behaviours described in the interviews are certainly not representative for the current 
evaluation practice within the organisation, for the purpose of this paper, i.e. to test 
within- and between-group agreement, I believe the interviews still provide valuable 
information.  
 
An interview protocol was developed to guide the interviews and to collect data in a semi-
structured format. After some introductory questions, the interview protocol focused on 
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the evaluation criteria that were used in the organisation to evaluate performance in 
general, which of these performance criteria were (perceived to be) emphasised the most 
by the area manager when evaluating the performance of branch managers, and the 
manner in which supervisors used these evaluation criteria. The interviews were not tape-
recorded. Notes made during the interviews were written out in as much detail as possible 
directly after the interview. The interview-transcriptions were sent back to interviewees 
to check the validity of statements. 
 
3.2 Results 
 
Introduction  
The interview data on how each of the two area managers intends to evaluate and is 
perceived to evaluate the performance of the branch managers is summarized in Table 1 
for Area A and table 2 for Area Y. <INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> <INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> The 
first column in both tables summarises the answers given by the area manager, and thus 
refers to intended evaluative behaviours. The other three columns in each table 
summarises the answers given by the branch managers, referring to perceived evaluative 
behaviours. The last column in table 2 summarises the answers of the Service Centre 
Manager in Area Y on the perceived evaluative behaviours of the area manager in 
evaluating the branch managers in general. 
 
Differences and similarities in evaluative behaviours between areas 
As shown in table 1 and 2, all respondents indicated that the performance evaluation of 
branch managers is primarily based on the extent to which branch managers meet the 
targets that are set as part of the management contract. Costs and quality are the two 
most important performance areas on which targets are included in the contract. Quality 
refers mainly to delivering mail in time and correctly, and is measured by on-time delivery 
of mail. The emphasis on quality in evaluating the performance of branch managers is in 
line with the quality-oriented strategy (Wiersma, 2008) pursued by the company, while at 
the same time there was a high emphasis on controlling costs, especially labour costs, 
because of the labour intensive processes. However, the tables reveal some interesting 
differences in how the performance of branch managers is evaluated between area X and 
area Y. First, as can be seen in table 1, in area X, the area manager and the three branch 
managers all indicated that besides costs and quality customer satisfaction and employee 
satisfaction (or worker satisfaction as Wiersma (2008) calls it) were part of the 
management contract of branch managers. Furthermore, both the area manager himself 
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and the three branch managers stressed that the area manager attached importance to 
these targets, although the primary emphasis remained on cost efficiency, which was 
given a weight of 50%, and on-time delivery (a weight of approximately 35%). The 
interviews revealed that the inclusion of customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction 
measures in the performance evaluation of branch managers reflected a recent 
organizational-wide change of emphasis. Both aspects had been measured for only two 
years, i.e. since 1995, as part of the stronger emphasis on quality in addition to cost 
efficiency. In contrast, in area Y, as shown in table 2, all four respondents only referred to 
cost and quality targets as part of the management contract. The interviews revealed that 
the area manager did consider customer satisfaction and employee motivation in the 
performance evaluation of branch managers, but merely as an indication of whether the 
branch managers were „people managers‟. The service manager also said that employee 
satisfaction was part of the performance evaluation, although this was a more subjective 
part in his opinion than cost efficiency (productivity) and quality targets. Yet the two 
branch managers did not mention either customer satisfaction or employee satisfaction in 
the interviews. These results suggest that, in 1997, there were important differences in 
how the recent emphasis of the organization on a broad concept of quality, including 
internal processes, was dispersed and emphasised in different areas across the 
organization. A second difference in performance evaluation that appears from the 
interview data is the emphasis on results (pre-set targets) versus on the processes by 
which these results were obtained (managerial behaviour). Area manager Y seems to 
adhere more strictly to pre-set targets than area manager X does. Although branch 
managers Y1 and Y2 may be able to explain why they did not achieve their targets, this 
does not change the fact that area manager Y still thinks that they should have attained 
the targets: managers have either met agreements or they have not; explanations can not 
change that. Yet, when managers provide a reasonable explanation this does influence 
what the consequences of not meeting the agreements will be for the overall evaluation. 
One of the branch managers in area Y described the manner in which his performance 
would be evaluated as follows: 
 
 “Initially, the conversation will focus on the items in the contract, but he will ask for 
the story behind it. Often he does already know the story anyway. The items in the 
contract are rigorous, and will be checked item by item. All items will be considered. 
And when I do not meet certain items, then at first it is not good. And even if I have a 
good story, it remains wrong. But it does not mean that the evaluation will be negative. 
If you are able to show what you did, then it will be taken into account in the 
evaluation”.   
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While area manager X also stresses that the agreements in the contract have to be met, 
the interviews suggest that area manager X puts a lot more emphasis on the process by 
which branch managers achieve the results than area manager Y, also in the daily practice 
between formal evaluation moments. The importance of how a branch manager operates 
is an ever-recurring theme during the interview with area manager X. First, when 
describing his own function, the area manager says: "I regard it as my most important 
responsibility to determine what has to be realised, but above all how it has to be 
realised." Second, concerning his own evaluation, the Area Manager says he slightly 
disagrees with how his boss evaluates him, because the evaluation is limited to the items 
in the contract, while he feels dedication is more important. "In evaluating my 
performance, my boss runs through almost every item on which an agreement has been 
made. I do not feel that's necessary." Third, the area manager has even introduced a 
special term (a verb) in his area to describe how he expects a (branch) manager to 
behave: "a manager has to ZIP". "ZIP" is an abbreviation of the Dutch words "Zelfstandig", 
"Initiatief nemend", and "Probleemoplossend", which can be translated as Autonomous, 
Taking initiative, and Problem solving (ATP). I will use the abbreviation of the English 
equivalents, ATP, instead of the Dutch abbreviation ZIP in the remainder of this paper. 
ATP is explicitly included in the contract as part of the agreements. A branch manager's 
contract in area X therefore contains agreements on expected outcomes and agreements 
on how the manager should achieve these outcomes. Both types of agreement are part of 
branch managers' performance evaluation. The area manager stated: 
 
"A branch manager who does not show ATP puts problems at my desk that do not belong 
there. A branch manager will come across that because I will point it out to him. He will 
also come across it at the end of the year during the performance evaluation meeting, 
because ATP is a part of the contract that we both signed at the beginning of the year... 
When I believe a branch manager does not show ATP, his evaluation will be somewhat 
negative. If the branch manager disagrees, he has to illustrate that he did show ATP. For 
example, if he claims to have shown problem-solving behaviour, then he should name, for 
example, five problems he solved in the past year.”  
 
The purpose of introducing ATP, however, is not to provide branch managers with an 
excuse for not reaching expected outcomes or to decrease the importance of meeting the 
targets. Quite the contrary, as the following quote from the area manager illustrates. 
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"The contract has to be observed. All agreements in the contract are realistic. They are 
obtainable with reasonable effort. However, in the past you could always explain why you 
did not attain these targets. People began to focus on finding good excuses to allow them 
not to attain their targets. I was very annoyed by that. I thought: “I work hard, but I do not 
attain my targets. What are my managers doing to attain them?” It had to change. The 
story that a branch manager puts forward for not attaining his targets has to be realistic. 
There have to be good reasons and you must be able to show what you have done to solve 
problems, or to attain certain targets. If a manager can show that he really managed 
everything well, deviations from the contract are allowed. Initially it is necessary to head 
for the targets; there should not be any discussion about these targets." 
 
Differences in evaluative behaviours within areas (between branch managers)  
The interviews with the branch managers in area X for the greater part supported the 
description of the (intended) evaluative behaviours that area manager X provided. 
According to two of the branch managers, although the area manager attaches importance 
to outcomes, he has defined another important component of performance, which is how 
you attain these outcomes. As one branch manager said: 
 
“The area manager calls it -and it becomes increasingly clear- showing ATP, he calls it 
moneymaking, and he calls it centralising the customer process. As to moneymaking, the 
area manager says: “you have a contract, but actually, you should be able to achieve even 
more than what‟s in it.” Thus, you get rid off: "now I have to spend my whole budget, 
otherwise I will have less to spend next year." ATP stands for Autonomous, Taking initiative, 
and Problem solving, so “don‟t bother me with your problems”. As to customer process: do 
you have the customer between the ears and can you bring it between the ears of your own 
subordinates". 
 
Similarly, another branch manager said: 
 
"Our contract includes not just targets, but also agreements on the manner of functioning: 
a number of behavioural characteristics that fit the management style that the area 
manager propagates. Then you talk about a number of concepts. What is essential to him is 
so-called ATP. That is autonomous, taking initiative, and problem solving... We have a 
culture -from the past, and a little exaggerated, and black and white- that we do what we 
are appointed to, and we try to do that well. However, do not ask me too much, too much 
own initiative, too many problems to solve, because than it becomes difficult. That applies 
especially to the shop floor. Therefore, the aim is that we start to do things, that we 
signalise things, that we embrace opportunities, and that we do not talk in terms of 
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problems, but in terms of solutions. It is not interesting whether something is a problem, 
but it is interesting whether you can settle it, and solve it."  
 
The descriptions that branch managers X1 and X2 gave of area manager X's evaluative 
behaviours seem to be consistent with each other, as well as with the description given by 
area manager X himself. However, the description of branch manager X3 shows some 
differences. According to branch manager X3, behaviour and effort were not part of 
performance evaluation. This branch manager stated that performance evaluation focuses 
on figures only; performance evaluation is too straightforward. Yet, this seems to 
contradict the impression the other three interviews provide: effort seems to be 
important; explanations for not attaining targets seem to be possible, lest they are 
realistic. All three branch managers referred to ATP, which is clearly referring to effort 
and behaviour, several times during the interviews; however, branch manager X3 did not 
mention it once. A number of reasons may explain this apparent contradiction. 
1. The interviews revealed that area manager X had only been employed in area X for a 
couple of months when I conducted the interviews. Thus, area manager X had not 
formally evaluated the branch managers yet. With the former area manager, as all 
three branch managers in area X emphasised in the interviews, performance was 
evaluated very rigidly against pre-set targets. Possibly, branch manager X3's 
perception of his current area manager's evaluative behaviours may be coloured by 
past experiences. Although this was not apparent from the interview with branch 
manager X3 himself, a comment from one of his colleagues, branch manager X1, 
concerning the visit he got from area manager X supports this explanation: 
 
“As part of the control cycle, we have progresses conversations, and two weeks ago the 
area manager was here.  He had said: “I will come to have a progresses conversation”.  
With the other boss it was always like this: prepare, and demonstrate to decimal places. 
So, thus I did. He immediately said: "Hey, it goes really well. I do not need to hear that at 
all. I would really like to know: how do you manage employee motivation?” So I sat here 
stuttering. I actually knew that he would do it like that, but you are still used to the cycle, 
in this case progresses conversation.”  
 
2. Branch manager X3 experienced trouble in meeting this year's agreement. In 
particular, the branch manager explained that he was using more labour than he was 
supposed to. He knew there was only a slight chance that he would meet his 
agreement on this item. He was sure that he would get a negative evaluation at the 
end of the year, and felt threatened by it. In contrast, branch managers X1 and X2 
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were quite sure they were doing a good job. The current performance may thus 
influence the perception of evaluative behaviours. Possibly, managers who experience 
trouble in achieving their targets may perceive their supervisor's evaluative behaviours 
in a different way than managers who know they are performing well. In this particular 
case, this effect may even be stronger because of past experiences (see the first 
reason above). 
3. While the two former reasons assume the difference in description occurred because 
of a difference in the perception of the performance evaluation, it is possible that this 
difference in perception reflected an actual difference in evaluative behaviours. In 
other words, area manager X may have differentiated his evaluative behaviours with 
branch manager X3 than with the other two branch managers. In this particular case, it 
is possible that area manager X did stress the importance of meeting the targets 
precisely because branch manager X3 had trouble meeting them. If the area manager 
at this stage would accept that branch manager X3 will not meet his targets, branch 
manager X3 may not do the best he can to meet them. Since both branch managers X1 
and X2 were likely to meet their targets anyway, there was no need to stress the 
importance of these targets. With these two managers the emphasis could be on what 
they did to attain these targets; these managers had to show that they attained their 
targets because of the way they managed, and not just because they got lucky. 
 
In area Y, the descriptions that branch managers Y1 and Y2 gave of area manager Y's 
evaluative style seem to be consistent with one another. Furthermore, these descriptions 
also appeared to be reasonably similar to the Although there were some small differences 
with the descriptions given by the service centre manager and the area manager himself, 
although, as explained above, there were some small differences regarding the 
importance of customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction. All three managers 
evaluated by area manager Y seemed to agree with the way in which they were evaluated. 
In contrast to the managers in area X, all managers interviewed in area Y had been 
employed in their current function for the past three years at least. The area manager 
selects the branch managers working under his supervision himself. The area manager 
explicitly stated that if managers received a formal evaluation mark "passable", they 
would have to do better in the following year. If they fail to do better, they have to find 
themselves another job. However, in contrast to the ATP notion in area X, the area 
manager Y does not provide clear guidelines on how performance can be improved. 
 
3.3 Conclusion empirical study 1 
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Although the qualitative nature of this study does not allow testing the statistical 
significance of within-group and between-group differences, overall, the results do 
support the hypotheses. As to hypothesis 1, the results indicate that there were 
similarities, but also differences in the perceived evaluative behaviours of their area 
manager between branch managers in area X and branch managers in area Y. 
Furthermore, in area X, the branch managers also experienced significant differences in 
evaluative behaviours of the former and the current area manager. These results support 
hypothesis 1, indicating that subordinate manager‟s perception of how their performance 
is evaluated depends on the supervisor who evaluates their performance. There also 
appeared to be differences within groups, although these differences were apparent in 
area X, but not in area Y. This partly supports hypothesis 2, and fully supports hypothesis 
3. These results are interesting, as combined they suggest that the level of within-group 
variability (or reversed, the level of within-group agreement) may not be homogeneous 
across groups in the same organisation, but may differ between groups. Yet, in the current 
study, the difference could also be due to methodological artifacts, as the respondents 
from area Y had worked together with their area manager for some years as compared to 
just a couple of months in area X. This difference in tenure with the supervisor may also 
reflect differences in the level of trust in the supervisor and/or in the quality of the 
supervisor-subordinate relationship. Leader-member-exchange theory (LMX) (Dansereau, 
Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Schiemann, 1978), for example, suggests that leaders will 
differentiate leadership behaviours towards subordinates within the work-group, based on 
the quality of the supervisor-subordinate relationship (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Scandura & 
Lankau, 1996; Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999). Thus, in area Y the quality of the 
supervisor-subordinate relationship may be high, while in area X this relationship may be 
low as there has hardly been time to develop this relationship. 
Finally, the results also seem to support hypothesis 4, indicating that there appears to be 
congruence in perceived and intended evaluative style. However, it should be noted that 
in the interviews with the area managers, area managers were asked to indicate how they 
in general evaluated the performance of branch managers. A different approach could 
have been to take a more dyadic approach, asking the area manager how he evaluates one 
or more specific branch managers. Such an approach would not only allow a distinction 
between intended differentiation in evaluative behaviours and perceived differentiation in 
evaluative behaviours, but also matching intended and perceived evaluative style for each 
superior-subordinate relationship.  
 
4. Empirical study 2 
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4.1 Research setting and methodology 
 
Sample 
As a complement to the qualitative approach of the first study relying on interview data, I 
conducted a second study using survey data with the purpose to statistically test for 
within- and between-group differences in evaluative behaviours. Since the RAPM literature 
lacks a reliable measure of evaluative behaviour that has external validity (Vagneur & 
Peiperl, 2000; Noeverman, Koene, & Williams, 2005), in this study I focused on feedback 
quality, an aspect of supervisors‟ behaviour in the context of performance evaluation that 
recently has received attention in the management (Steelman, Levy, & Snell, 2004; 
Steelman & Rutkowski, 2004) and accounting literature (Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2009). 
Data was collected on the quality of feedback provided by supervisors from 60 employees 
employed in a Big Four Accountancy firm located in a large city in the Netherlands. The 
data reported here was collected in the summer of 2009 as part of a broader study 
(reported elsewhere). The data was collected using convenience sampling rather than 
random sampling, as I did not get permission to use a written questionnaire to collect data 
from all employees. A student working on his master thesis under the supervision of the 
author was allowed, however, to collect data from employees who were present at the 
office on three separate visits to the office. Practically all employees who were 
approached by the student agreed to fill out and hand in the questionnaire immediately. 
This data collection process did not allow testing for the possibility of non-response bias. 
Even though some bias may exist due to the sampling method, there is no reason to 
suspect that such bias would be different across groups of subordinates reporting to one 
supervisor. Therefore, I believe the potential bias due to the sampling method does not 
cause problems in interpreting the results on within- and between-group variance. To be 
considered a group, at least 3 employees should report on the feedback quality of the 
same supervisor. This definition of a group implied that nine employees, reporting to five 
different supervisors, had to be removed from the sample, leaving a final sample of 51 
employees reporting to eight different supervisors. These eight groups varied in size from 
three employees to ten employees.  
 
Variable measurement 
Feedback quality was measured in this study using the instrument from Steelman, Levy, & 
Snell (2004). This instrument has been used in various management studies before, but 
also in a recent accounting study by Hartmann & Slapnicar (2009). The instrument contains 
four items, asking respondents to indicate the extent to which feedback provided by their 
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supervisor was consistent and useful using a 5-point Likert scale. This measure was 
chosen, because it seems to have acceptable psychometric properties and equal interval 
measurement, which are characteristics required for using rWG (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 
1984; see also Castro, 2002) and WABA (Castro, 2002). Furthermore, in previous studies 
(Steelman, Levy, & Snell, 2004; Whitaker, 2007) the scale has been shown to have high 
internal validity, i.e. Cronbach‟s alpha > .87. In my study, the mean score on feedback 
quality was 3.73 and the standard deviation was .51, with scores ranging from 2.5 to 4.5. 
The internal reliability coefficient (Cronbach‟s alpha) was .69, which is satisfactory, but 
lower than expected based on previous studies. 
 
Data analysis technique 
Because only data from subordinates‟ was collected, hypothesis 4 was not addressed in 
this second study. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I used within- and between-entity analysis 
(WABA) (Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino., 1984; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). WABA is 
a test to assess statistically and practically whether variance in the data is primarily due 
to within-group differences (group parts level of analysis), between-group differences 
(whole group level of analysis), or both (equivocal condition, group level of analysis is 
inappropriate). However, WABA only allows testing within- and between-group variance 
for the sample as a whole. I was also interested in possible differences between groups of 
subordinates (hypothesis 3). To test whether such differences occurred, I computed the 
within-group agreement (rWG) coefficient (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; 1993; see 
Lebreton & Senter, 2008 for details on this coefficient). Since the rWG coefficient is 
calculated for each group separately, in contrast to WABA, this coefficient allows me to 
compare within-group agreement or lack thereof across groups. 
One of the most complicated factors in using rWG -based indices is choosing the null 
distribution (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). The null distribution is the theoretical distribution 
used to assess the expected variance in item-scores or scale-scores when there is a total 
lack of agreement, thus assuming that all respondents (raters) respond randomly (James, 
Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Although typically a uniform 
distribution is used as a null distribution to estimate the expected variance, LeBreton & 
Senter (2008) emphasise, following James, Demaree, & Wolf (1984) and Schriesheim et al. 
(2001), that the null distribution needs to be justified theoretically. Since a uniform 
distribution assumes the absence of any cognitive and affective biases in responding to 
questionnaire items, such a distribution, given the overwhelming evidence of the 
existence of such biases, is almost certainly biased in itself, inflating rWG. Therefore, 
rather than simply relying on the assumption of a uniform null distribution, the expected 
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variance to be used with the rWG index was based on previous empirical findings (cf. 
Schriesheim, Cogliser, & Neider, 1995) as summarised in table 3. <INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
Table 3 shows that only two studies (Steelman, Levy, & Snell, 2004; Whitaker, 2007) 
report the mean and standard deviation of feedback quality. The reported standard 
deviation and corresponding variance in these two studies are much smaller than the 
variance expected under a uniform distribution. Instead, the variance reported in both 
studies suggest that a normal distribution is more likely, although the reported mean is 
slightly higher than the mid-scale point, suggesting a slight bias towards the higher end of 
the scale (negative skew). Therefore, using the table with variance estimates under 
different distributions as provided by LeBreton & Senter (2008), I will show rWG values 
under the usual assumption of a uniform distribution (with expected variance of 2.00), 
under the assumption of a slight negatively skewed null distribution (with expected 
variance of 1.34), and under the more realistic assumption of a normal distribution (with 
expected variance of 1.04). 
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
WABA I 
The right –hand side of table 4 reports the outcomes of the WABA approach. As pointed 
out by Schriesheim, Neider, & Scandura (1998, p. 308), the decision rules to draw 
inferences from WABA are outlined in detail in Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984, 
pp.169-185 and Yammarino & Markham, 1992, pp. 171-172. Following these decision rules, 
first the practical significance of within- and between-group variance was assessed, based 
on the E-test. This test indicates that within-group is significantly greater than the 
between-group variance using the 15o level of practical significance, but not when using 
the more conservative 30o level. Because the E-test indicates that within-group variance is 
larger than the between-group variance, a corrected F-test should be used (Dansereau, 
Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984). The corrected F-test is calculated as the inverse of the F-
ratio with N-J degrees of freedom for the numerator and J-1 degrees of freedom for the 
denominator (Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984; Yammarino & Markham, 1992; 
Schriesheim, Cogliser, & Neider, 1995), where N is the number of subordinates and J is the 
number of groups. So, in the test, critical values for the F-ratio with 43 and 7 degrees of 
freedom of approximately 3.33 and 5.88 were obtained from a table at the .05 and .01 
levels of significance respectively. Taking the inverse, this leads to critical values of the 
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corrected F-test of 0.300 (p < .05) and 0.170 (p <.01). Thus, the F-ratio obtained in the 
sample of .404 is not statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. Overall, these 
results should be interpreted as equivocal at the group level, with a weak tendency 
towards a parts condition because of the practical significance at 15o. The equivocal 
condition at the group level supports the view that a group level of analysis is not 
appropriate, and suggests that the appropriate level of analysis could be that of the 
individual subordinate. Overall, the results from WABA I confirm hypothesis 1 and 2. 
 
rWG  
Table 4 reports the rWG values for each of the eight managers on feedback quality. To 
interpret rWG, as a rule of thumb, George (1990) suggested that values above .70 are 
necessary to demonstrate high within-group agreement. This criterion is not without 
debate in organisational research (LeBreton, James, & Lindell, 2005; LeBreton & Senter, 
2008), and recently several other criteria have been developed to interpret rWG. LeBreton 
& Senter (2008), for example, suggest the following guidelines: rWG values from 0 to .30 
indicate lack of agreement, from .31 to .50 weak agreement, from .51 to .70 moderate 
agreement, from .71 to .90 strong agreement, and values above .90 show very strong 
agreement. Following these guidelines, table 4 shows that under the assumption of a 
uniform null distribution there is strong within-group agreement in two groups (group 4 
and 5), and very strong agreement in the other six groups. Using a slightly skewed null 
distribution, in five groups the within-group agreement remains very strong, while in three 
groups (groups 4, 5 and 8) the within-group agreement is strong. Finally, under the more 
realistic assumption of a null distribution with expected variance of 1.04 only in two 
groups (group 1 and 2) the within-group agreement is very strong, in four groups (group 3, 
6, 7, and 8) the within-group agreement is strong, and in two groups (groups 4 and 5) 
within-group agreement is moderate. These results illustrate the importance of defining a 
realistic null distribution in calculating and interpreting the within-group coefficient, as 
there appear to be substantial differences in values of rWG under different null 
distributions. Yet, the results also show that only the absolute value of the within-group 
coefficient changes as a result of specifying different null distributions. The ranking of 
within-group agreement coefficients within the sample does not change, and, except 
under the assumption of a uniform null distribution, the results suggest that there seem to 
be considerable differences in rWG -coefficients across groups. In particular, overall we 
may conclude that groups 4 and 5 have relatively low rWG coefficients, while group 1, 2, 3 
and 7 have relatively high coefficients, with group 6 and 8 somewhere in between. 
  25 
It should be noted that instead of the guidelines used here, more advanced tests have 
been developed to evaluate the statistical significance of rWG (Charnes & Schriesheim, 
1995; Dunlap, Burke, & Smith-Crowe, 2003; Cohen, Doveh, & Nahum-Shani, 2009) or to 
estimate the expected variance if each individual responded at random creating pseudo-
groups (Bliese & Halverson, 2002; Lüdtke & Robitzsch, 2009). However, to test hypothesis 
3, I was not interested in evaluating the (significance of) individual rWG values per se, but 
rather in assessing whether the apparent differences in rWG values between groups are 
statistically significant. For this purpose, I used a test recently developed by Pasisz & 
Hurtz (2009). This test is based on O‟Brien‟s (1979; 1981) method to test variances 
between groups which is robust for non-normality and unbalanced design. In this method, 
the original raw data are transformed so that the transformed values equal the group 
variances of the raw data (O‟Brien, 1981). These transformed data are then used in a 
mixed-model ANOVA where the supervisors are entered as a between-group variable and 
the transformed ratings of feedback quality are entered as a within-group variable (see 
Pasisz & Hurtz, 2009 for more details about the procedure). To conduct this test, I used 
the SPSS syntax provided by Pasisz & Hurtz (2009) in the appendix of their paper. The test 
revealed that there was no significant interaction effect between supervisor and the 
transformed ratings, indicating that there were no significant differences in the pattern of 
agreement across supervisors across the four items of feedback quality, F (21, 129)=.657, 
p=.398. Since there is no significant interaction between groups and ratings, the between-
subject effects can be interpreted unambiguously (i.e., does not vary across the four 
items comprising the scale), but was found to be not significant, F (7,43)=1.098, p=.382.  
Thus, no significant differences in the average variances across groups were found, and 
hypothesis 3 is rejected.  
 
4.3 Conclusion empirical study 2 
The findings of the second study indicate that feedback quality varies both within- and 
between-groups, but no significant differences are found in within-group variability 
between groups. These findings support the view that feedback quality, as perceived by 
subordinates, is an individual level variable, independent of groups. These results should, 
first of all, be viewed in light of the small sample size. WABA I also provided practical 
significance tests, which are independent of sample size. The practical significance E-test 
indicated a tendency towards a parts within groups level of analysis, which could not be 
confirmed with an F-test of statistical significance. The small sample size makes it 
impossible to detect statistically significant differences in between-group variances as 
compared to within-group variances unless such differences are large. A second point of 
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concern when interpreting these findings is that the combination of WABA I and rWG is not 
without problems. WABA I assumes homogeneity of variance, while the test to determine 
significant differences in rWG coefficients is in fact a test of homogeneity of variance 
(Pasisz & Hurtz, 2009). Thus, if significant differences were found in rWG coefficients, this 
would have casted doubt on the appropriateness of the WABA I analysis. Although I did not 
find significant differences in rWG coefficients, it is important to note that testing 
hypotheses 1 and 2 thus assumed that hypothesis 3 should be rejected. If, however, 
hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected, it is important to develop theory to explain the 
differences in rWG coefficients between the original groups. Based on such theory, 
different homogeneous (sub)groups within the sample should then be identified that allow 
re-testing hypotheses 1 and 2 using WABA. In this way, WABA I and rWG can be used as 
complementary tests, also in future studies. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Although limited in scope, both empirical studies reported in the previous sections provide 
evidence that significant within- and between-group differences in evaluative behaviours 
of supervisors exist within single organisations. However, the findings with regard to 
differences in within-group variability are mixed. In the first study notable differences 
occurred between the two groups of subordinates, but in the second study no statistically 
significant differences in within-group variability were found. Finally, there is some 
evidence that at least part of the within-group differences in evaluative behaviours that 
subordinates perceived were intended by the superior. As a whole, these findings, 
especially when taking into account some of the limitations of the two empirical studies, 
have a number of implications for future research.  
First, these findings suggest that “evaluative styles”, as a consistent pattern of evaluative 
behaviours of one supervisor, are not likely to exist. Although an average evaluative style -
whether perceived by subordinates, intended by the supervisor, or perhaps both- can be 
assessed for a single supervisor, such an average style ignores important within-group 
variances, which makes the concept of style as a characteristic of a supervisor rather 
meaningless. Following leadership literature, where the concept of average leadership 
style (ALS) is “seriously out of vogue” (Schriesheim, Cogliser, & Neider, 1995, p.117) and 
leadership style has been replaced by a focus on different leadership dimensions, I suggest 
to replace the concept of “evaluative style” with that of “evaluatorship”. The term 
“evaluatorship” can be used as an umbrella concept in future research that refers to a 
range of evaluative behaviours and attitudes of supervisors displayed when evaluating the 
performance of subordinates. In the context of management accounting, important 
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evaluative behaviours (as part of evaluatorship) could be the use of accounting 
information such as budgets, performance measurement diversity, budgetary participation 
or other forms of voicing opportunities, or different forms of subjectivity.  
Second, the empirical evidence in this study suggest that perceived or intended 
evaluatorship is more likely operating at the individual level of analysis than at a group-
level. This finding may be dependent on the particular evaluative behaviour considered in 
this study. Feedback quality as one aspect of evaluatorship may vary primarily at the 
individual level of analysis, while other characteristics may vary primarily at the level of 
parts within groups. For example, Moers (2005) investigated bias and discretion in 
performance evaluation. But if there is a forced distribution, a supervisor may base 
performance ratings also on the relative performance of each subordinate in comparison 
to other subordinates within the same group. Thus, perhaps the most appropriate level of 
analysis to study the use of bias in performance ratings could be that of the within-group 
level. Furthermore, the data reported here was collected at the level of either the 
supervisor or the subordinate as a whole. The results from the first empirical study, 
however, partly support a dyadic approach. A dyadic approach would imply that data on 
evaluatorship should be collected from matched pairs of supervisors and subordinates. 
Since in the second empirical study data was collected from subordinates only, the data 
did not allow me to test the dyad as an appropriate level of analysis. This would be a 
fruitful avenue for future research, with many research opportunities. For example, even 
at the dyadic level, the theoretical question is whether we expect wholes or parts at this 
level. Furthermore, the hierarchical nestedness of dyads within groups is also of interest. 
For example, are some dyads within groups more homogeneous than other dyads within 
the same group? Finally, studying the development of evaluatorship in the context of 
dyadic relationships over time would also be an interesting topic for further research. The 
leadership literature on LMX is just starting to consider such issues (see, for example, 
Henderson et al., 2009; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Future research should try to 
incorporate recent findings from this literature into management accounting research on 
performance evaluation. 
Third, consideration of levels of analysis as in the current study is relevant for many other 
concepts included in management accounting research, and particularly research on 
performance evaluation. Consider performance for example, or task uncertainty, or 
environmental uncertainty, which may all occur at different levels-of-analysis, depending 
on the exact theorising of the construct. Again, measurement and data analysis in these 
cases should fit the level of theory. 
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Fourth, even though evaluatorship could be viewed as an individual level variable, the 
relationship with other variables may occur at different levels than the individual level of 
analysis. Thus, although it is important to consider level of analysis issues for single 
constructs as in this study, future research should extend the analyses to levels-of-analysis 
issues in relationships, both bivariate, multivariate, and moderated relationships. For 
example, does the relationship between feedback quality and procedural justice 
perceptions (Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2009) hold at the individual level or (also) at the 
dyadic level or even at the group level? Addressing questions like this should be guided by 
theory, and the data analysis should confirm the hypothesised relationships at the 
specified level of analysis.  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this study, in particular the limited scope of the 
investigation and the small sample size, this study discloses fruitful avenues for future 
research on the role of supervisors in performance evaluation. When careful consideration 
is given to the level of theory, level of measurement, and level of analysis, the ambiguity 
of findings that characterises earlier research on this topic, with the RAPM literature as 
the most well known example, may be prevented in the future. In particular, this study 
shows that future research would benefit from combining insights from the leadership 
literature with insights from the accounting literature. Such integration is rare in both 
fields. Yet, the management and leadership literature may profit from accounting studies 
that study the role of supervisors in performance evaluation as a complement to the 
design of the performance evaluation system, taking into account the appropriateness of 
the performance measures used within the evaluation. In the accounting literature, in 
turn, a stronger focus on the role of supervisors, taking a more managerial approach, is 
likely to contribute to a more thorough understanding of the effects of performance 
measures on the motivation and behaviour of lower level managers and employees. Such 
research would truly contribute to a better understanding of performance evaluation as an 
important tool from the management control toolbox.  
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Table 1. Intended and perceived role of area manager X in performance evaluation of branch managers 
 Area Manager Branch managers   
 X X1 X2 X3 
Description of function of branch 
manager 
Manner of functioning. Not just 
long and hard working, but 
especially ATP as a characteristic 
of the management style. 
Emphasis on managerial 
behaviour. 
Realise company goals, but 
preferably do more than that. 
Responsible that mail is 
delivered, no matter the 
circumstances (keep customers 
satisfied). Control costs, but also 
meet quality targets. Keep my 
employees motivated. 
Question not asked in interview. Realise company goals in such a 
way that all employees like their 
jobs 
Performance evaluation in 
general: 
Contract needs to be met. 
Targets are realistic. In general: 
no excuses and no discussion 
about it. If targets are not met, 
branch managers need to have a 
real good and realistic 
explanation, and provide 
evidence about what they have 
done about it. 
Based on management contract 
(50%), and 50% on how you attain 
the targets, your effort, 
management behaviour. But you 
need to attain the targets. 
Based on management contract, 
but a few items are highlighted 
by AM. How you do things is 
important. But you need to attain 
the targets. 
Based on targets in contract, no 
agreements on desired behaviour. 
- Performance areas (targets) in 
contract 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality; 
3. Customer satisfaction; 
4. Employee satisfaction 
 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality; 
3. Customer satisfaction; 
4. Employee satisfaction 
 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality; 
3. Customer satisfaction; 
4. Employee satisfaction; 
5. Contribute to area as a whole 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality; 
3. Customer satisfaction; 
4. Employee satisfaction 
- Role of area manager In addition to contract emphasise 
management behaviour: ATP, 
management style. “A manager 
who shows ATP will without any 
doubt meet his targets.” 
AM emphasises management 
behaviour. This is a general 
agreement, but not a formal part 
of the performance evaluation 
cycle. AM calls it ATP: “don‟t 
bother me with your problems”. 
“He does not like to deal with 
someone else‟s problems”. 
AM emphasises how you manage 
your branch. This should 
contribute to attaining your 
targets, also in the long run. And 
he has emphasised a few items 
from the contract that are 
controllable. 
AM emphasises in meetings that 
there is more than numbers and 
costs in meetings. But the 
contract only contains what needs 
to be achieved, not how. 
- Performance areas to which 
area manager attaches most 
Targets from the contract 
(management by exception). The 
1. Agreements in contract; 
2. Management behaviour: ATP 
1. Costs: 50%; 
2. Quality, but not sure of the 
1. 50% costs; 
2. 35% quality; 
  34 
importance when evaluating 
branch managers? 
targets are the boundaries within 
which the branch managers need 
to operate. But not just meeting 
targets, they also have to show 
ATP. 
percentage; 
3. management style, my 
behaviour: ATP 
3. 15% others, such as client and 
employee satisfaction 
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Table 2. Intended and perceived role of area manager Y in performance evaluation of branch managers  
 Area Manager Branch managers  Service manager 
 Y Y1 Y2 Y3 
Description of function of branch 
manager 
Support adequate management of 
mail delivery, control costs and 
quality, people management. 
Take care that customers in our 
geographical area receive their 
mail in time and correctly, with 
high quality standards 
Making money for the company; 
being on the shopping floor; 
deliver mail with high 
productivity (mail volume divided 
by labour capacity) 
 
Performance evaluation in 
general: 
Based on management contracts. 
Benchmarking is very important. 
Some branch managers are not 
able or willing to perform. 
Benchmarking will show that. 
These managers get a second 
chance, but not a third. 
Based on management contract. 
No agreements on how targets are 
achieved. 
Based on management contract. 
Contract is contract. Once the 
targets are set, they cannot be 
changed. 
Based on management contract. 
For branch managers: contract. 
Also on how targets need to be 
achieved: customer satisfaction 
and employee motivation.  
- Performance areas (targets) in 
contract 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality. 
 
1. Costs; 
2. Quality. 
 
All targets have to be met, and 
all targets are important.  
For branch managers: 
1. Labour costs and productivity; 
2. Other costs; 
3. Quality. 
- Role of area manager Costs and quality targets are 
company norms. In setting targets 
for customer satisfaction and 
employee motivation, it is 
important to take into account 
current situation within the 
branch. More meetings with 
branches with lower performance 
than with good performing 
branches. 
In distinguishing between good 
and excellent branch managers, it 
is important how the manager 
achieved his results: is it really 
good in the long run?  
AM makes standard contract.  
AM is very to the point. “If you 
have to do something, he simply 
says: “Solve it!” How you do that 
is up to you”. 
AM focuses on the numbers. If you 
do not meet your targets, he will 
ask what you are going to do to 
meet them. 
Every quarter of a year the items 
from the contract are discussed in 
a meeting with AM. 
AM allows branch managers to 
make an additional agreement on 
one item in particular. For this 
item a stretching target is agreed 
upon. 
“The AM says: “if I do not visit 
the branch, it is good”.” 
(management by exception) 
“If AM visits the branches, he will 
sit with the employees, work with 
them for a short period, to grasp 
the work atmosphere”. 
AM evaluates performance 
primarily on basis of objectified 
targets. Targets have to be met. 
Targets will differ between 
branch managers, because they 
are personalized. 
AM will visit all branches at least 
once a year. “But if performance 
is below target, he will visit a 
branch more often and ask the 
branch manager: “what are you 
going to do to still meet your 
contract? And how can we 
help?”.” 
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- Performance areas to which 
area manager attaches most 
importance when evaluating 
branch managers? 
Costs and quality. If you don‟t 
meet these targets, you have a 
problem. Customer satisfaction, 
employee motivation and 
absenteeism are important 
indicators to see if a manager 
besides paying attention to costs 
and quality also is a people 
manager. 
Costs and quality. Costs (labour), productivity and 
quality. 
1. Productivity; 
2. Quality: same weighting as 
productivity. 
3. Employee motivation. This has 
a lower weight, and is more 
subjective than the first two. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of feedback quality in earlier studies 
 
Study Mean SD Scale n Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Steelman, Levy, & Snell 
(2004); 
Steelman & Rutkowski (2004) 
 
4.76 
 
1.40 
 
7-point Likert 
scale 
 
405 
 
.92 
Whitaker (2007) 4.22 0.93 
7-point Likert 
scale 202 .87 
Hartmann & Slapnicar (2009) NA NA    
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Table 4. Within-group agreement coefficients and WABA I results for feedback quality 
 
Groups n rWG 
 
Eta E 
Corrected 
F-testa 
 
Inference 
  Un SS Emp  Within Between    
1 3 0.99 0.98 0.98  
NA 
2 6 0.96 0.93 0.91  
3 6 0.95 0.92 0.89  
4 8 0.88 0.78 0.68  
5 5 0.88 0.77 0.66  
6 6 0.94 0.90 0.86  
7 7 0.95 0.91 0.89  
8 10 0.92 0.86 0.81  
 51     .844 .537 .637† .404 Equivocal 
           
a Degrees of freedom are 43, 7  
† Significant by the 15o test 
†† Significant by the 30o test 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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